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Mindful or our difficulties about food I told [Fazlul Huq] 
that he simply must produce more rice out of Bengal for Ceylon 
even if Bengal itself went short! 





The doctrine of sufficiency and sufficiency and sufficiency 
must be preached ad nauseam. 




  The dead body of a…boy was found floating in a ditch near 
the Adamdighi railway station…the deceased along with his 
brother was coming towards Adamdighi to get ‘Prasad’ from the 
local ‘Puja Baris’.  In the midway the younger brother was 
staggering fell down unconscious.  Seeing him on the verge of 
death the elder brother, to get rid of him, pushed him into the 
ditch and then hastened to the ‘Puja Bari’ and partook of the 
‘Prasad’. 
 




  Although the broad chronological and demographic contours of the Bengal 
famine of 1943-44 are well known,
1 its underlying causes are still debated.  The  
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authorities at the time blamed the unfolding crisis on undue war-induced 
hoarding by merchants, producers, and consumers.  This interpretation was 
repeated in the officially-appointed Famine Inquiry Commission’s Report on 
Bengal, which also accused local politicians and bureaucrats of incompetence.  
The view that the famine was mainly due to market failure in wartime 
conditions rather than to adverse food supply shocks was popularized in the 
1970s and 1980s by Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen.  Sen’s now-classic account not 
only began an academic debate about the Bengal famine; it also switched the 
analysis of famines generally away from food availability decline (FAD) per se to 
the distribution of, or entitlements to, what food was available.  Bengal, Sen 
argued, contained enough food to feed everybody in 1943 but massive 
speculation, prompted in large part by wartime conditions, converted a minor 
shortfall in food availability into a disastrous reduction in marketed supply.  
Sen’s analysis has been enormously influential.  As his interpretation of the 
Bengali evidence continues to be focus of specialist discussion, for specialist and 
non-specialist alike the Bengal famine has become a near-paradigmatic famine.
2   
Crucially, the famine was a war-famine.  Rangoon had fallen to Japanese 
forces in March 1942.  In the following months they sank a destroyer and several 
merchantmen in the Bay of Bengal, and engaged in the sporadic bombing of 
Bengali cities; an air raid on Calcutta in December 1942 caused considerable 
panic and the displacement to the countryside of thousands of civilians.  
Although Japanese forces were too thinly spread to risk an invasion, Bengal 
remained exposed and vulnerable.  Its usual supplies of Burmese rice, albeit a 
small proportion of aggregate consumption, were cut off.  On military advice, 
officials removed rice and paddy deemed surplus to local requirements from  
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coastal districts such as Midnapur, Bakerganj, and Khulna.  They also 
requisitioned and destroyed boats capable of carrying ten or more passengers to 
prevent their use by any invading Japanese soldiers.  This ‘boat denial policy’ 
compromised the livelihoods of two of the most vulnerable groups—fishermen 
and boatmen—and increased transport costs.  Moreover, the authorities 
prioritized Calcutta, where many workers were engaged in war-related 
production, over the rest of the province.  More than half of India’s war-related 
output was produced in Calcutta by an army of workers numbering up to one 
million, ‘made up to a considerable extent of a volatile class recruited from 
outside Bengal’.  Concern for the city’s ‘priority classes’ accounted for the 
forcible requisition of rice from mills and warehouses in and around the city in 
late December 1942.
3   
Sen also made the more general point that famines are unlikely in 
democracies, since free assembly, a free press, and the threat of electoral 
redress force elites to intervene.
4  Research by Besley and Burgess, using state-
level evidence from post-independence India, corroborates; they find that 
greater newspaper circulation and electoral accountability prompted more 
generous and effective public disaster relief.  This finding is supported by Banik, 
also on the basis of recent Indian data.
5   
The role of the press during the Bengal famine is interesting in this 
respect.  On the one hand, wartime censorship limited the freedom of the press 
to criticize or, indeed, to publish news deemed damaging to the war effort.  A 
good case in point is the devastating cyclone that struck Midnapur on October 
16
th 1942, news of which took nearly a fortnight to reach a senior minister in the 
Bengal government.  Only in January 1943 was the real scale of the damage  
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revealed, ‘mainly because at the outset it was necessary to suppress the full 
details, as these would have been of value to the Japanese’
6.  Opposition 
spokesmen claimed that the severity of the impending famine was being kept 
from the people because ‘the government has gagged the press and forbidden 
public meetings where food problems are likely to be discussed’
7.  Newspapers 
supporting the nationalist Quit India movement were censored or shut down at 
this time and their editors fined or imprisoned.
8  A clandestine press and an 
underground opposition operated, but were poor substitutes for the genuine 
article.  The case of Bengal suggests that Sen’s hypothesis might thus be 
extended to democracies or semi-democracies during wartime.   
On the other hand, the government did not ban press reports of the 
famine, nor did it ban newspapers not deemed directly subversive.  Amrita 
Bazar Patrika and The Hindustan Times, for example, continued to appear,
9 
although they presumably engaged in some self-censorship, as did pro-
government newspapers.  Ministers also expected the press to propagandize on 
their behalf.  In Bengal in 1943 this meant helping to calm public fears about the 
food supply and to counter the ‘psychological factors’ responsible for food 
shortages and price rises.
10  Here the case of Bengal’s most influential English-
language daily, the Calcutta Statesman, is of particular interest.  The Statesman 
won accolades for publicizing the famine through a series of graphic photographs 
published in August 1943 and later.
11  Yet for months beforehand, it toed the 
official line, berating local traders and producers, and praising ministerial 
efforts.   
The Statesman and Calcutta’s other leading English-language newspaper, 
Amrita Bazar Patrika, nonetheless also published a great deal of useful  
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information on assembly debates, policy shifts, price movements, and local 
conditions throughout 1943 and 1944.
12  Information culled from these 
newspapers informs much of what is in this paper, the outline of which is as 
follows.  Part 2 addresses how those in authority—the British, local 
administrators, Hindu and Muslim politicians—interpreted and reacted to the 
enfolding crisis.  Part 3 re-examines evidence on prices, hoarding, and land sales 
during and in the wake of the crisis.  Part 4 discusses the regional dimension of 
the famine.  Part 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. THE UNFOLDING CRISIS 
 
‘Famine conditions of 1770 are already upon us’. 
Amrita Bazar Patrika editorial, August 1943 
 
  Even before the end of 1942 Bengal’s prospects were already causing 
disquiet in London, Delhi, and Calcutta.  The weather was not propitious, with 
much more rain than normal in the west of the province in October-November.  
Meteorological data indicate that rainfall had been above average across much 
of west Bengal, although only six out of ninety-one weather stations—
Berhampore (Murshidabad), Sonamukhi (Bankura), Midnapur, Contai, and 
Gopiballabhpur (Midnapur) and Ulumberia (Howrah)—recorded rainfall more than 
two standard deviations above the average (see Table A1).
13  In early December 
a memorandum from the Delhi Government’s Food Department informed the 
Secretary of State in London of an impending crisis due to ‘loss of Burma rice,  
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floods in Sind, cyclones in rice growing areas of Bengal and Orissa, and an 
indifferent rice crop generally in Bengal which is the main rice producing 
province’.   
  In January 1943 a committee appointed by Calcutta’s corporation 
suggested the need for food rationing.
14  By March-April the situation was 
already critical both in coastal sections of Midnapur, where the cyclone had 
struck, and in eastern Bengal.  Relief works began, albeit on a small scale, in 
villages near Dacca in March, and food rations were supplied to government 
employees at controlled prices.  In early April a deputation from Chittagong, 
next to Japanese-occupied Burma, prompted an assurance from a senior official 
that rice and paddy (rough, unhusked rice) supplies would be provided 
‘immediately’ and food rationing introduced there shortly.  In Patgram in the 
extreme north, in ‘very many cases’ barley chaff was being substituted for rice.  
There was hardship too in Ishwarnagar in the eastern division of Khulna, where 
high food prices were hitting labourers, the lower middle classes, and ‘those 
cultivators who have got a small quantity of land and whose paddy crop has 
failed’
15. 
An outbreak of cholera in Calcutta in May 1943 drew media attention to 
the growing influx of poor people from the surrounding countryside.  The 
migrants’ habit of queuing for hours for food in front of controlled shops led 
them to ‘indulge in unhygienic practices and create unhealthy conditions in the 
localities where shops are located’.
16  The poor were also blamed for the 
appalling state of the city’s dustbins.
17  Meanwhile the Ministry of Civil Supplies 
announced that labourers’ food rations in Calcutta in future would consist of 
equal shares of atta (a kind of wheat flour) and rice, in order to release rice for  
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the rural areas.  Urban workers were expected to ‘cheerfully bear this sacrifice’ 
for the sake of others who required assistance ‘very badly’
18.  In early July the 
government opened its first food shop in Calcutta, selling rice at 6 annas per 
seer (about 2lbs.) to the very poor.  H.S. Suhrawardy of the Muslim League, as 
the minister responsible for civilian food supplies, made the first sale.
19  
Meanwhile ‘growing economic distress’ in the city was producing a considerable 
increase in petty crime.
20  Classic symptoms of famine, such as the sales of girls 
and women, mass migrations into the towns and cities, and the consumption of 
‘unedibles and meat from dead cows’
21, were widespread by July. 
The regional incidence of the famine may be inferred from Maps 1 and 2.  
Map 1, based on the classification adopted by the government’s revenue 
department, was criticized for omitting subdivisions found to be ‘appreciably or 
even severely affected’ in an ambitious survey organized by statistician P.C. 
Mahalanobis for the Indian Statistical Institute (ISI).  Map 2, based on an 
alternative classification and deemed more reliable by Mahalanobis,
22 highlights 
two clusters of ‘very severely affected’ subdivisions.  The first, in the coastal 
west, includes two subdivisions in Midnapur (Contai and Tamluk) and one 
(Diamond Harbour) in 24-Parganas.  The second much larger cluster contains 
twelve subdivisions straddling the eastern divisions of Noakhali, Tippera, Dacca, 
and Faridpur.  In addition, eight subdivisions to the north of the second cluster 
and twelve to its west were ‘severely affected’.  Both maps imply that the 
western half of the province, apart from the three subdivisions in the first 
cluster and ‘severely affected’ Howrah, escaped relatively lightly. 
 At the outset the official stance was that there would be no problem as 




23  As the crisis intensified the focus shifted to hoarding, whether out of 
fear or greed, which the authorities blamed for the ‘maldistribution’ of available 
rice supplies.  Until the crisis degenerated into out-and-out famine, the policy 
mantra—as articulated by Secretary of State for India Leo Amery in London, 
Viceroy Lord Linlithgow in Delhi, and Suhrawardy in Calcutta—was that ‘grave 
maldistribution’, was the problem.  Although all parties, ‘from the cultivator 
upwards’
24 were to blame, no treatment was too severe for profiteers and 
hoarders; they should be handled ‘rough’, and—in the words of a European 
member of the local assembly—this was ‘also most decidedly the view which 
prevails in the UK and in Russia’
25.   
In a candid unpublished account written in the famine’s wake, regional 
commissioner for food supplies Henry Braund conceded that he, in common with 
‘the official classes and most business men’, had initially dismissed ‘the whole 
thing as the result of panic and “hoarding” ’.  The authorities in Delhi were 
particularly insistent on denying an ‘intrinsic shortage’.  And although 
Suhrawardy warned his audience at an important official conference about food 
supply in Delhi in early July that Bengal was ‘in the grip of a very great famine’, 
representatives of other Indian provinces ignored him and applauded instead the 
suggestion that ‘the only reason why people are starving in Bengal is that there 
is hoarding’.  But Braund also conceded that even in March some brave officials—
and he named two—were predicting famine.
 26 
Bengal Governor John Herbert began to sound the alarm in private in 
early July
27, but his report that the food drive had located only 100,000 tons in 
stocks of 400 maunds or more was interpreted by Linlithgow as evidence of ‘how 
much is in fact available’
28.  By mid-July, however, Linlithgow had changed his  
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tune and was demanding food imports as a matter of extreme urgency, no 
matter ‘how unpalatable this demand must be to H.M.G.’ and realizing its 
‘serious potential effect on military operations.
29  Linlithgow wished to 
announce the imminent arrival of food shipments in his valedictory address to 
the New Delhi legislature.   
Back in England, for months Amery had insisted that the problem was one 
of hoarding, and that there was ‘no overall shortage of foodgrains…but a 
maldistribution for which responsibility is shared by all parties from the 
cultivator upwards’.
30  Amery now began to take Linlithgow’s pleas seriously and 
argued the case at a war cabinet meeting on 31
st July.  But his insistence that 
failure to help would seriously compromise India’s role as a theatre of war fell 
on deaf ears.
31  The war cabinet held that ‘the shortage of grain in India was not 
the result of physical deficiency but of hoarding’ and that grain imports would 
not solve the problem.  Against Amery’s pleas, it supported the position of the 
minister for war transport, who was willing to offer ‘no more than 50,000 tons 
[of wheat from Australia] as a token shipment…to be ordered to Colombo to 
await instructions there’ and 100,000 tons of Iraqi barley
32.  On August 16
th 
Amrita Bazar Patrika published a telling cartoon on its front page of emaciated 
people on a beach with ships carrying food in the distance, with caption ‘A 
Mirage! A Mirage!’  
In early September Amery was informed by the minister responsible for 
war transport that he had ‘an actual deficiency of ships’ for the operational plan 
prepared by the military and approved by cabinet.  A few days later, General 
Auchinleck, head of British forces in India, echoing Amery’s request, pleaded 
with the chief of imperial general staff in London that ‘so far as shipping is  
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concerned, the import of food is to my mind just as if not more important than 
the import of munitions’
33.  Later Amery tried the same argument: conditions in 
Bengal were becoming ‘a serious menace to supply operations and the 
movement of troops, and also very bad for troop morale’.  To no avail: on 24
th 
September the war cabinet decided that diverting ships to lifting grain for 
delivery in India before the next Indian harvest would not be possible.  This 
prompted Amery to muse in his diary that ‘Winston [Churchill] may be right in 
saying that the starvation of anyhow under-fed Bengalis is less serious than 
sturdy Greeks, at any rate from the war point of view, but he makes no 
sufficient allowance for the sense of Empire responsibility in this country’.
34  
Although in mid-October Amery was still referring in public to only ‘scarcity 
verging on famine’, in private he must have known that the game was up.   
Suhrawardy, new to his post, was probably misled at first by the gospel of 
‘plenty’ propagated by the colonial authorities.  His early pronouncements were 
based on the ‘theory that there is sufficiency and that is the duty of the 
Government to make the best of resources within the province’.
35  Soon enough, 
he realized that Bengal was in serious trouble, although he was under pressure 
from Delhi and London to stress ‘sufficiency’ and ‘hoarding’.
36  There was little 
effective that he could do; he could not apply the Famine Codes
37 because the 
food required to sustain the prescribed rations was lacking.  So he appointed an 
expert to devise a form of gruel that would contain as little rice as possible, and 
advised the poor to try substitute foods.  He organized the food drives, 
described in more detail below.  He announced at the end of August that 
rationing would be introduced in Calcutta and the industrial areas (but only in  
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October).  He also claimed that the rest of India was gradually realizing Bengal’s 
parlous state, and held to the hope that prices would soon fall.
38  
The Statesman changed its tune in early July, with an editorial on the 
province’s need of ‘more and cheaper food’.  By mid-August it was much more 
critical, stating that the crisis menaced Bengal ‘in many ways…apparently there 
are months of this penury and disintegration to come’
39; referring to the 
‘growing annoyance’ being caused by long speeches calling on public opinion to 
rally behind the official campaign against hoarding; and commenting acidly that 
‘presumably these loud assertions about evildoers growing rich on the people’s 
misery have their foundation in knowledge’.  ‘If there are large-scale culprits’ 
the Statesman held, ‘they should be ruthlessly jumped on without further delay, 
and there will be applause for the jumper’.
 40  Thereafter, the Statesman—and 
Amrita Bazar Patrika—adopted a policy of reporting on the extent of starvation 
frequently and graphically.  Its photographic images of the famine made world 
headlines.
41  On October 5
th it editorialized: 
 
We have not liked all the comments lately transmitted from 
Britain about the Bengal famine.  Some have looked neither 
tactful nor true. ..There has been the further obscuring factor of 
war-time censorship which until a fortnight or so ago seems 
virtually to have withheld from the British public knowledge that 
there was famine in Bengal at all.  But a proportion of the cabled 
comments seem to have been inspired (we choose this verb 
deliberately) by a wish to lay blame for catastrophe wholly on 
Indian shoulders. 
 
By now, the Statesman doubted Suhrawardy’s credibility, given his 
‘earlier disingenuousness or ill-informed propagandistic optimism’
42.  Later, it  
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confessed that it too had been duped into false hopes.  In a strongly-worded 
editorial in mid-January 1944 the Statesman berated Amery for blaming the 
provincial authorities for the famine, and for claiming that ‘when it became 
necessary for the Government of India to act, it did so promptly’.  Part of the 
blame lay with ‘Mr. Amery’s own important office in Whitehall’:
43 
 
Throughout the months when disaster in Bengal 
approached, the authorities in London, as in New Delhi and 
Calcutta, were lavish in soothing assurances that no genuine or 
serious food-shortage existed in India, the perceptible signs of 
deaths being due merely to transient maladjustment originating 
mainly from defective transport.  Conceivably (though we do not 
think so) officialdom’s policy was to deliberately conceal from 
the Indian public ugly certainties then well known to themselves, 
in order that unavoidable factual dangers might not be worsened 
by others of a psychological sort.  But in that case there is no 
particular reason for supposing that the realities of the situation 
are being candidly placed before the public now.  Government 
cannot have it both ways. 
 
Bengal’s rice output in normal years was barely enough for barebones 
subsistence.  An output of 9 million tons translates into 1 lb per day or less than 
2,000 kcals per adult male equivalent.  Even allowing for imports from 
neighbouring provinces and Burma, the province’s margin over subsistence on 
the eve of the famine was slender.  It is hardly surprising, then, that almost 
from the outset there was controversy about an issue that has dominated the 
historiography on the Bengal famine: the extent of the aman [autumn rice] 
harvest shortfall in late 1942 and of food availability in 1943.    
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Although the authorities in London and New Delhi expected political 
leaders in Bengal to argue the case for adequacy, the weak coalition government 
that ruled until late March 1943 was ambiguous on the issue.  In early January 
1943 its agriculture and industries minister, the Nawab Bahadur of Dacca, sought 
to reassure consumers by claiming that although the 1942 aman crop was less 
than the previous year’s, it was no worse than that of 1940.  In February, 
however, the Nawab announced that estimated rice production in 1942/3 (6.9 
million tons) was far short of consumption requirements (9.3 million), an 
assessment that caused the price of rice to rise significantly.  His statement, 
according to the Communist People’s War, ‘encouraged hoarding right and 
left’
44.  In March the Nawab revealed that Bengal was also short of other 
essential foodstuffs, ‘namely wheat, dal [dried pulses], mustard, sugar, and 
salt’.  As for rice, the loss of Burmese imports, military demands, the so-called 
‘denial policy’ which had led to the requisitioning of stocks in areas vulnerable 
to Japanese attack, and ‘hoarding on a fairly extensive scale’ had produced local 
shortages.
45 
In opposition, the Muslim League accepted that Bengal was short of rice; 
its leader even warned that ‘the disaster of 1770 would be re-enacted’ unless 
effective action was taken.
46  In power, its main spokesman, H.S. Suhrawardy, 
insisted at first that despite local difficulties and maldistribution, the province 
contained enough food.  He promised soon to publish ‘full statistical details’ 
that would clearly show that there was ‘a sufficiency’, and to inform the public 
of far-reaching measures that would stabilize prices and supplies ‘on a long-term 
basis’
47.    
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‘Sufficiency’ was the cornerstone of the Suhrawardy plan, announced on 
May 11
th, which promised to identify hoards and arrange for their fair re-
distribution, and to open more controlled shops, where limited amounts of food 
would be available at subsidized prices, in Calcutta.  It would also establish food 
committees to discover and help stamp out anti-social behaviour, help organize 
a Grow More Food campaign, and ‘bring in supplies from outside’.  Its slogan, ‘do 
not grind the faces of the poor’, was directed at hoarders.   
As ministers and their supporters intensified their attacks on hoarders and 
speculators—in mid-April the Statesman called for tougher action against ‘the 
hoarder and speculator’, and suggested special courts to bring the ‘evilly 
disposed’ to book, while in mid-May a senior politician referred to them as 
‘national enemies’
48—opposition spokesmen blamed the authorities for ‘clouding 
issues on the assumption that there are hoards of foodstuffs in the rural areas of 
Bengal which, if made available, will solve the problem’. 
The numbers promised by Suhrawardy, buttressed by a ‘surmise’ 
regarding the carry-over of rice stocks from the previous year, were immediately 
attacked as faulty and unreliable by two widely respected scholars at a meeting 
organized by the opposition in Howrah.  Professor Radhakamal Mukherjee held 
that it was ‘not safe to take too optimistic a view of Bengal’s food resources at 
this juncture and stress… psychological factors… rather than the economic factor 
of serious actual food shortage’.  Henry Braund, who as regional food 
commissioner should have been in a position to know, claimed that at the end of 
1942 the carry-over position was ‘precarious’.
49  Less than a week later an 
opposition party working committee ‘express[ed] deep concern at the food 
situation [and] called on the authorities not to juggle with figures but to admit  
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candidly that Bengal was a deficit province and to deal with the situation with 
an appreciation of the stern realities’
50. In the course of a lengthy debate in the 
local assembly in mid-July, the opposition accused ministers of obfuscating 
reality by focusing on carry-over and hoarded stocks, and demanded that Bengal 
be declared a famine area.  A prominent opposition leader noted that the 
previous ministry had at least ‘declared that there was shortage of food in 
Bengal and they made the Government of India accept that position’, but that 
Suhrawardy had played a ‘colossal hoax’ on the people by saying there was no 
rice shortage in Bengal.
51  
By early July Suhrawardy had changed his tune somewhat:
52 
 
I have found criticisms made against me that I had stated 
that there was no shortage when actually there was serious 
shortage in the Province.  I do not plead guilty to the charge.  It 
appeared to me that insistence on shortages would only increase 
panic and stimulate hoarding and thereby aggravate the general 
food scarcity and push up prices. 
 
Later, his reply to the accusation that ‘for five months he had declared 
that there was no shortage of foodgrains’ would be that ‘mere insistence on 
shortage would not help anyone’
53.  Even in mid-October, when describing the 
crisis as ‘unprecedented famine’, he still added a plea to cultivators and traders 
to release stocks for public consumption, prompting the Statesman to muse that 
‘many will certainly disbelieve’ his forecast that prices were bound to fall. The 
Statesman went on to criticize politicians for their ‘disgraceful’ record of ‘false 
or ignorant prophecy’, noting how Amery, Delhi, and Suhrawardy’s ‘inept’  
 
16
predecessors had ‘proclaimed that food-shortage in India and Bengal was 
practically non-existent’.
54  
In Bengal, socioeconomic status broadly overlapped with religion, and 
pre-existing religious tensions conditioned the positions adopted by various 
parties during the famine.   Pre-partition Bengal had a Muslim majority.  The 
Muslim share was highest in the east of the province (Map 3).  Where Muslims 
were in a minority, as in Calcutta, they tended to live in residentially segregated 
areas.  Moreover, the sectarian divide was widening over time.  In Calcutta, for 
example, the Muslim share of the population remained at about one-in-four 
between 1901 and 1941, but the coefficient of variation in the Muslim share 
across the city’s districts rose from 0.50 in 1901 to 0.65 in 1921 and 0.71 in 
1941.   
Bengali Muslims were poorer and less educated, but well mobilized 
politically.  The poorest strata among the peasantry were disproportionately 
Muslim, and Muslim leaders prominent in 1943 such as A.K. Fazlul Huq, H.S. 
Suhrawardy, and Khwaja Nazimuddin had cut their teeth on populist communal 
politics in the 1920s and 1930s, supporting pro-peasant land reforms and controls 
on moneylending.  Hindu politicians were more likely to represent landlord and 
trading interests, as well as the genteel and literate bhadralok.  Communal 
rioting took on an economic hue, with Muslim wrath directed particularly against 
Hindu and Marwari traders and moneylenders.
55 
Communal tensions had escalated in the twentieth century.
56  Muslims, 
broadly speaking, sided with the British authorities as the Hindu intelligensia 
rejected the Raj.  After 1939 the Muslim League, representing the majority of 
Muslims, supported the war effort, while Hindus were unenthusiastic at best.   
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There were also divisions within the two main confessional groups, however.  
Fazlul Huq, first minister of Bengal from 1937 to 1943, was more willing to 
collaborate with Hindu politicians, and not trusted by the colonial authorities, 
who connived in the collapse of his weakening coalition in late March 1943 and 
its replacement by a more pliant Muslim League administration, headed by 
Khawaja Nazimuddin.   
 ‘The Hindu section of the traders is dominant in the internal economy of 
Bengal’, noted P.C. Joshi, general secretary of the Communist Party of India, in 
People’s War.
57  Moneylending was mainly in the hands of Hindu banias (traders), 
mahajans (usurers), and landowners, and the Bengal Moneylenders’ Act of 1940 
had hit them hard.
58  Thus the hoarders targeted by the Muslim League during 
the famine were likely to be Hindus.  While the League was criticised for giving 
contracts to the trading firm of Isphahani Brothers, prominent Muslim League 
supporters, the Hindu Mahasabha attacked the government and ‘big firms, 
particularly non-Bengalis’ for holding on to excess stocks.  The pro-bhadralok 
Mahasabha also claimed that repeated warnings against hoarding only served to 
create panic especially among ‘the poor middle class people who were obliged 
to keep small stocks to meet the present abnormal situation’.
59  Religious 
affiliation thus influenced the positions taken by leading actors during the 






3.  MARKETS, PHANTOM HOARDS, AND LAND SALES: 
 
I think, looking back, that the adoption of the psychology or gospel 
of ‘plenty’ in Bengal was a mistake. 
 
Henry Braund, colonial administrator
60 
 
In late 1942 the crisis in Midnapur and panic about the aman harvest 
caused both the price of rice and its coefficient of variation across Bengali 
markets to rise abruptly (Figure 1).  This placed so much pressure on markets in 
neighbouring Bihar that its governor felt ‘compelled to prohibit the export of any 
food-stuffs from Bihar except under permit’.
61  Prices then settled briefly, but 
the removal of price controls and the Nawab of Dacca’s declaration caused them 
to take off again in March.  In Calcutta the price of rice rose from Rs. 10 per 
maund in November 1942 to double that five months later.  In late March the 
price reached Rs. 29 in Rangpur and Rs. 27 in Cox’s Bazaar, and it hovered 
between Rs. 25 and Rs. 30 per maund in Patgram in the extreme north of the 
province.  In early April rice cost Rs. 23 in Comilla and over Rs. 25 in Dacca.
62  At 
the end of April Fazlul Huq challenged his successor to bring down the price of 
rice, since ‘if it was the fault of his [i.e. Huq’s] ministry that the price of rice 
had gone up, let Sir Nazimuddin [his successor] bring it down’
63. 
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The imposition of price controls on 20
th August 1943 led to rice shortages 
even in Calcutta.  Many dealers found it virtually impossible to obtain rice;  
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others disposed of their stocks before the order came into effect and did not 
replenish them because they could not even purchase rice at Rs. 30 per maund, 
the maximum sale price.  The ordnance also forced many rice dealers to close 
shop.  Meanwhile Suhrawardy warned traders against withholding stocks from 
the market.
64 
Between August and December 1943 a significant gap separated official 
and black market prices.
65  The black market price of rice rose to Rs. 40 per 
maund in Calcutta, but by mid-October rice was being sold openly at Rs. 50 to 60 
in the eastern division of Mymensingh, and soon would reached Rs. 80 in parts of 
east Bengal.
66  Prices began to fall as soon as producers were reassured about 
the quality of the new aman crop.  Traders began to dispose of existing stocks of 
old rice at Rs. 18 to Rs. 25 per maund for rice of medium quality.  While 
considerable shortages persisted in some areas soon the new crop began to 
appear in bazaars in the interior in late November and was being sold at about 
Rs. 16 per maund.  The general opinion seemed to be that prices would continue 
to drop unless the government proceeded to buy up the crop, in which case 
cultivators and speculators would hold, driving the price back up again.
67 
  A few weeks later, however, supplies had dried up again in the eastern 
division of Mymensingh, where dealers from Dacca and elsewhere were buying it 
up at prices above the controlled rates.
68  In mid-January 1944 the price of rice, 
which had fallen from Rs. 40 a maund to Rs. 11 and Rs. 12 as new grain began to 
come on the market a few weeks earlier, rose to Rs. 22, or Rs. 5 above the 
controlled price.  Official sources, however, claimed that the price of rice was in 
fact falling; they reported prices of Rs. 15 at Howrah, Rs. 11-8 at Contai, and Rs. 
16-4 at Calcutta on January 17




69  Government purchases of aman rice may have been partly to 
blame for any rebound; opposition spokesmen held that distress was persisting 
due to a ‘continued rise in the price of rice and paddy’.  In response to 
Suhrawardy’s denial that prices were rising ‘throughout Bengal’—only in certain 
deficit areas—opposition spokesman produced detailed evidence on price rises in 
the mofussil (rural districts).
70 
  The relative buoyancy of prices in early 1944, given the general 
impression that the late 1943 aman harvest had been a good one, argues against 
the presence of excessive hoarding on a large scale at the height of the famine.  
It would be silly to claim that no merchants or traders tried their hand at 
speculation; the point is that had the famine-inducing prices of summer and 
autumn 1943 been mainly due to hoarding, then the release of hoarded rice 
thereafter would have forced prices down more than they actually fell.  In early 
1944 the real price of rice was roughly the same as two years earlier. 
  Three further points regarding prices bear noting.  First, the literature has 
focused on price movements over time, paying less attention to price variation 
across the province.  As noted earlier, the rise in the black market price of rice 
was much greater in east than in west Bengal at the height of the crisis, 
suggesting intra-provincial as well as inter-provincial balkanization.  Second, the 
war forced up the price of rice and wheat across the subcontinent (Figures 2-4).  
Increases were relatively mild until 1942/3, but big in 1943/4.   Figures 2 and 3 
show that the national market for rice became more segmented from 1940/1 on, 
while that for wheat became so only in 1943/4.  Note too how the gap between 
rice prices in Bengal and the rest of India (Delhi apart) widened in 1943/4.  The 
wide range of wholesale prices quoted for rice in early June 1943—for example,  
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Rs. 30-8 per maund in Chandpur-Puranberar (Bengal), Rs. 18-2 in Purnea (Bihar), 
Rs. 12-10 in Bareilly (U.P.), Rs. 6-4 in Larkana (Sind)
71—suggests that the 
balkanization of Indian markets exacerbated Bengal’s supply problems during the 
famine.  
 
[FIGURES 2-4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
   Such balkanization ruled out one of the remedies emphasized by the 
classical economists, i.e. the cushion provided by free trade when harvests 
failed, as the balance of trade in foodstuffs adjusted to relative price 
movements.
72  Evidence from pre-industrial Europe suggests that markets 
functioned more or less normally during famines there.
73  Certainly, there was 
no prospect of this happening in Bengal in 1943.  The ‘basic plan’ devised in 
Delhi late 1942 envisaged Bengal obtaining 370,000 tons of rice—about four per 
cent of its annual requirements—from the rest of India in the year beginning 
December 1942, whereas in the seven months from December 1942 it actually 
received 44,000 tons.
74 During the famine, the reluctance of neighbouring 
provinces to supply Bengal was a frequent bone of contention, well captured by 
the remark of the governor of neighbouring Bihar, who had just imposed an 
embargo on food exports from that province.  ‘By conviction’, he confided to 
Linlithgow, ‘I hold with Adam Smith but in a crisis like this I am prepared to 
accept 100% control.’
75  Symptomatic, too, was the response of representatives 
of the other provinces to Suhrawardy’s statement at an All-India Food 
Conference in July that Bengal was ‘in the grip of a very great famine, probably 
of a size and nature that may be equal to the Orissa famine of 1867’:  they  
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greeted the suggestion by another delegate that ‘the only reason why people are 
starving in Bengal is that there is hoarding’ with applause.
76 
  
[FIGURES 5 AND 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Third, prices in general rose during the famine.  A cost-of-living index for 
Bengal before and during the famine is lacking, but cost of living indices for the 
working classes in three northern Indian cities report increases ranging from 105 
to 125 per cent between January 1942 and January 1944.
77  Figure 5, which 
summarizes market price data for a range of food items (meat, vegetables, fruit) 
as reported in the Statesman between January 1943 and March 1944, confirms 
that price rises in Bengal were by no means confined to rice. 
 
 
The ‘food drives’ of June and August 1943 followed from the hoarding 
hypothesis.  The first drive, which excluded the twin cities of Calcutta and 
Howrah, began on June 7
th.
78  Local food committees, assisted by thirty thousand 
temporary workers, were charged with taking stock of resources available and 
‘arranging for their equitable and amicable distribution amongst the village 
population as a whole’.  Suhrawardy, who described the food committees as an 
extension of the traditional panchayat (village assembly), promised not to 
intervene except ‘where persuasion has failed, or where a surplus in one area 
has to be transferred to a deficit area’.
79  He promised that his officials would 
‘enter every household and look under every taktaposh and…drag out the 
hoards’, and his officials held that the food drive was responsible for reported 
falls in the price of rice in a ‘number’ of districts in early June.
80  The Statesman  
 
23
backed Suhrawardy’s attempts at ‘getting out, from wherever it is, such hoarded 
food as exists…with what result is not yet clearly seen’, and lauded his 
contribution to the assembly debate on the food situation.
81 
The drive unearthed little rice, however.  At first, Suhrawardy claimed 
that boats and carts had been used to conceal stocks; some, he said, had been 
shifted ‘into jungles’.
82 Soon however, it was clear that the vast majority of the 
rural population was short of food, and that the drive had laid bare ‘an acute 
shortage’.  Unless large stocks were to be found in and around Calcutta, warned 
ABP, the official ‘thesis’ of Suhrawardy and the Government of India would be 
‘completely demolished’.
83  Under pressure to provide disaggregated data on the 
outcome, Suhrawardy admitted that while he had no statistics, ‘the general 
picture was that in most places a deficit had been reported’.  Nor would 
Suhrawardy, whose mantra had by now switched to ‘To hope for the best and to 
prepare for the worst’, reveal how any surpluses were disposed of.
84  Nalini 
Sarkar of the pro-Congress Swarajya Party conceded the drive’s usefulness as an 
exercise in statistical intelligence, but wanted to know why the public had not 
yet been informed its outcome, and whether enough hoarded food had been 
located to meet ‘the present situation’.  Given the government’s heavy 
emphasis on hoarding, it was important that it published the results of the drive 
soon.  Sarkar, a prominent business leader, did not believe that ‘very big’ stocks 
existed.
85   
Criticism that the exclusion of Calcutta and Howrah led to a food drive 
directed against urban hoarders in early August 1943.  That two-day drive 
employed police attached to the Department of Civil Supplies to deal with large 
merchants, local police to deal with small merchants, and authorized officers  
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drawn from the local civil service to deal with householders and smaller traders.  
It involved a total of 2,850 officers visiting 250,000 units, or an average of nearly 
100 units each.  Each policeman or official was accompanied by two volunteers, 
in order to help and ‘generally to protect the interests of the people’.  The drive 
lasted from dawn to dusk on both days.  In the case of merchants or shopkeepers 
stocks of 20 maunds or more required a licence.  The official view was that 1.25 




th 1943 were declared public holidays in order to facilitate 
house-to-house inspections in the two cities. The ‘drive’ was explained as a 
means of ascertaining stocks.  According to the Statesman, ‘in several houses 
officers discovered stocks far in excess of the unit’s requirements and these 
were duly ‘frozen’, i.e. the groups were directed not to remove or in any way 
dispose of them until further notice’.  The search also unearthed ‘numerous 
instances of stocks above the amount permitted’.  In the following days the 
Statesman was silent on any unearthed hoards, although its European op-ed 
columnist continued to insist on the vital need to unearth ‘the millions of tons 
which would be required for consumption in the Provinces in which they were 
hidden’
86.  Within a fortnight, however, Suhrawardy was conceding that in 
Calcutta stocks in the hands of consumers, traders, and employers were ‘not 
considerable’
87.  The ‘food-search’ had revealed enough for a month’s 
subsistence in the city, including stocks in the hands of government officials and 
employers.





In October a joint statement from the Bengal, Indian and Marwari 
Chambers of Commerce expressed doubts ‘whether apart from the stocks which 
the government are fully aware and are virtually under their control, there are 
any appreciable undeclared stocks held by merchants in Calcutta or outside’
89.  
This assessment tallies with a confidential memorandum prepared by the 
Government of India Food Department, and forwarded by Linlithgow to Amery on 
7
th September 1943, which found:
90 
 
The much-heralded ‘anti-hoarding’ drive in the Bengal districts 
and in Calcutta has achieved very little that is positive.  The 
Bengal Government themselves do not claim that it is more than 
a ‘food census’, disclosing stocks in the districts amounting to 
rather more than 300,000 tons.  The Bengal Government 
emphasises that this is ‘stock’, and is in no sense ‘surplus’, 
except to a negligible extent.  In Calcutta itself practically no 
stocks were disclosed which would be classified as ‘hoards’, or 
were held in contravention of the Foodgrains Control Order. 
 
The relatively small number of traders fined during the spring and summer 
of 1943 is further circumstantial evidence against large-scale speculative 
hoarding.  Throughout the crisis the authorities campaigned against the twin 
offences of hoarding and profiteering.  Traders who withheld stocks without 
declaring them, and traders who made a false declaration, were liable to fines, 
imprisonment, and the confiscation of their stocks.  Retailers charging more 
than the controlled price were similarly liable and might be barred from carrying 
out business in future or deprived of supplies of key items such as coal and 
kerosene.  The non-trading hoarder, whose motive was fear, was not immune,  
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but the main target of the campaign was the creature who, ‘for sheer greed, 
grabs and withholds from circulation the food of his fellowmen’.
91 
In the circumstances, it is striking how relatively few traders were 
charged or convicted for hoarding and profiteering in rice during 1943.  Thus, in 
the week ending April 7
th 1943 thirty-nine cases of profiteering were detected; 
eighteen related to sugar, nine to kerosene, eight to coal, two to salt, and two 
to atta.  In the following week 104 cases were dealt with, of which fifty-five 
related to sugar, twenty-five to kerosene, twenty to coal, one to mustard oil, 
and three to medicines.  During the week ending April 28
th, the Ministry of Civil 
Supplies proceeded against eighty-two people for profiteering and hoarding; 
twenty-nine cases related to sugar, and twenty-seven to coal.   There were 
thirty-eight prosecutions for hoarding and profiteering in the week ending May 
14
th, of which nineteen related to coal and ten to sugar.  Of the nine people 
convicted for profiteering in Calcutta on May 27
th, one was fined for hoarding 
rice, five for profiteering in sugar, and three for profiteering in coal and coke.  
The total number of prosecutions in June came to 174, of which forty-eight 
related to sugar, thirty-two to coal, and thirty-four each to oil and kerosene. 
The total number of prosecutions for profiteering and hoarding reached 622 in 
July; 130 related to atta and flour, 115 to sugar, ninety-two to kerosene, eighty-
one to coal, fifty-two to mustard, and only forty-three to rice.
92  Again, of the 
168 prosecutions for hoarding and profiteering in Calcutta in December 1943, 
twenty-eight related to kerosene, twenty-eight to medicines, twenty-one to 
coconut oil, eighteen to paper, and only fifteen to rice.
93  This would suggest 
that the authorities had no difficulty in discovering hoarders of other basic 




The huge increase in forced land transfers during the famine is also 
consistent with a poor harvest.  Hundreds of thousands of ryots were forced to 
sell off some or all of their land; 1.7 million land transfers were made in 1943, 
and 22.9 per cent of families were forced either to sell or mortgage all or part of 
their paddy land.
94  Chattopadhaya and Mukerjea noted that the price of paddy 
land varied from Rs. 150 to Rs. 200 ‘or a little more’ in different areas in 1939; 
in 1943 their surveyors noted average prices of Rs. 258 in Contai, Rs. 184 in 
Diamond Harbour, Rs. 175 in Tangail, and Rs. 352 in Feni.  Given that between 
1939 and 1943 the cost of living more than doubled and the price of rice rose by 
considerably more
95, this indicates a reduction in the real price of land.  Figure 7 
shows that sale values did not rise with sales; given the nominal (though not 
real) rise in the price of land, the average size of land transfers must have fallen 
during the famine.
96   
  This implies that most of the sales were by smallholders normally reliant 
on agricultural labour to make ends meet, and who needed the cash to buy food.  
This is hardly surprising, but even P.C. Joshi, leader of the Communist Party, 
conceded that the middle peasantry also suffered in 1943. ‘How is it’, he asked, 
‘that even the middle peasant has to sell off; where did his rice go?’  Joshi’s 
answer—that ‘he got humbugged by the hoarder and tempted by the high price 
offered’ and ‘began sinking to the status of a pauper’—lacked conviction.  But 
that nobody had enough food in Joshi’s view, except a small minority, ‘the 
zamindars, the rich jotedars, and the mahajans’, surely implies a general supply 
shortage.  The zamindars were big landlords and the jotedars major landholders  
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and employers of labour, while the mahajans belonged to a business caste that 
specialized in moneylending.
97 
The Communists played a curious game during the famine.  The party’s 
support for the war effort led to its legalization in 1942.  Its organizational and 
relief work won it plaudits during the famine, although its anti-Congress stance 
and uncritical support for the war alienated many.  The party and its affiliates 
vigorously supported the food drives,
98 and even after the authorities conceded 
that there was a food availability problem, the party weekly People’s War 
continued to target the hoarder.  It reserved its greatest scorn for S.P. 
Mookerjee and the Hindu Mahasabha: ‘Dr. Shyamaprosad [Mookerjee] gives the 
lead, the Hindu hoarders pay the cash and call the tune, the Fifth Column gives 
the cadres’. Although Mookerjee had courted the support of the masses by 
organizing relief on communal lines, his policies helped ‘not the Hindus of 
Bengal but only its Hindu hoarders’, and he relied on ‘Fifth Column youngsters 
from the Forward Bloc, Anushilan, etc’ to dole out the relief.
99  Asok Mitra later 
castigated the party for its ‘tame emphasis on the need to prevent food riots 
and unearth hoarding’, noting that ‘with the access they enjoyed at that time to 
information, they should have known that if anyone were hoarding to the point 
of forcing a famine on the country it was the central and provincial governments 
and their purchasing agents’
100. 
Finally, Table 1 describes the impact of the famine on household debt by 
occupational group. The proportion of families in debt virtually doubled between 
1943 and 1944.  The ‘Other Agricultural’ category refers to rent receivers and 
non-cultivating landowners (including widows).  No group seems to have been  
 
29
immune; curiously, the table implies no striking difference between 
agriculturalists and non-agriculturalists.   
 
 




  To summarize.  There was a food availability problem, though its extent 
cannot be resolved with any accuracy.  Some believed that the true situation 
was even worse than implied by the Nawab Bahadur of Dacca’s declaration in 
February 1943, and that some of the aman crop in west Bengal rotted only after 
it had been harvested, but against this there is the assessment of a leading 
merchant and Muslim League politician that the shortage in 1943, taking 
carryover and the likely size of the aus harvest into account, was only one 
million tons.
101  In normal times, Bengal might have been resilient enough to 
cope with such a shortfall; in 1943, given military requirements and war-related 
disruption to trade and communications, this was a disastrous deficit.    That 
there was a deficit may be inferred from informed commentary at the time, 
from the failure of the food drive, and from the high incidence of forced land 
sales by starving peasants.   
 
 
4. THE REGIONAL DIMENSIONS OF THE FAMINE: 
As noted earlier, the impact of the Bengal famine was quite uneven by 
region (Maps 1 and 2).
102  Calculations of its demographic toll are constrained by 
reliance on imperfect censal and civil registration data.  Yet estimates of vital 
rates before and during the famine imply that nearly two-thirds of the excess  
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mortality between mid-1943 and mid-1944 and nearly three-quarters of the 
reduction of births in 1944 occurred in east Bengal, in divisions constituting 
present-day Bangladesh
103 (Maps 4 and 5, based on Maharatna 1996).   
Two factors affecting the late 1942 aman crop—the Midnapur cyclone and 
an outbreak of brown rust disease (Helminthosporium oryzae)—were mainly 
confined to western Bengal.  The role of brown rust disease is still controversial.  
According to Amery its effect had not been recognized locally until about April 
1943.  Some hold that its impact was far greater than conceded at the time, 
however, with plant pathologist S.Y. Padmanabhan claiming that ‘nothing as 
devastating as the Bengal epiphytotic of 1942 has been recorded in plant 
pathological literature .
104  Official data, warts and all, confirm that the decline 
in agricultural output was proportionately greatest in the west (Map 6).  The 
extent of the damage caused by the fungus was not realized until the crop had 
been harvested; certainly the manner in which the cyclone dislodged flowering 
paddy plants in the coastal west increased their vulnerability to fungus.  Final 
crop forecasts by the director of agriculture
105 imply massive declines of over 
half relative to 1941 in the 1942 aman crop in the divisions of Burdwan, Bankura, 
Midnapur, Rajshahi, Rangpur, and Malda.  Harvest deficits in divisions normally 
in deficit, located mainly in the east (Map 7), were smaller.  Map 8 describes the 
variation in literacy across the province, as represented by the proportion of the 
adult population which was literate; its south-north gradient hardly reflects 
relative famine intensity either. 
This pattern described in Map 2 squares reasonably well with that of 
excess deaths (Map 4), whereby the five worst-affected divisions were Midnapur, 
Howrah, Murshidabad, Dacca, and Tippera.
106  Map 5 indicates that the declines  
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in births were greatest in Dacca, Pabna, Faridpur, Tippera, Mymensingh, and 
Murshidabad (in that order).  The demographic outcome in the largely urban and 
industrial division of Howrah muddies the water.  Although births hardly declined 
in Howrah—indicating that the crisis was less severe there—the death rate rose 
considerably.  This anomalous outcome is perhaps explained by the deaths in 
Howrah of migrants from nearby rural areas.  However, as noted above, Map 2 
singles out Howrah, and the division is also included in an October 1943 
assessment of the worst-affected areas by the acting governor of Bengal.
107 
The following analysis, loosely replicating that by Mokyr and others for 
mid-nineteenth century Ireland,
108 is based on data from twenty-four of Bengal’s 
divisions, and excludes the more urbanized divisions of Howrah and Hooghly.  
The dependent variables are the changes in the birth and death rates.
109  DDRA 
is the increase in the death rate in July 1943-June 1944; DDRB also includes 
excess deaths in July-December 1944.  DBR is the reduction in the birth rate in 
1944.  These are regressed on: 
 
MAGQ: agricultural output per head  
DAGQ: proportionate change in agricultural output 
MUSLIM: Muslim percentage of the population 
DENSITY: population per square mile  
PCURB: urban percentage of the population 
CDR: the crude death rate before the famine   
YOUNGLIT: child and young adult literacy rate  
PRATIO: ratio of rice price during the famine to its pre-famine level  
 
  The variables and the correlations between them are described in Tables 
2 and 3.  The outcome of the regression analysis is described in Tables 4 and 5.   
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In Table 4 the results using DDRB are somewhat stronger than those using DDRA.  
The only variables to pack a significant statistical punch were DENSITY41, CDR, 
DBR, and YNGLIT.  High population density and a high non-crisis death rate were 
associated with bigger increases in the death rate.  Higher literacy rates among 
the young—a proxy for living standards in the recent past—had the opposite 
effect.  Table 5 describes the outcome of modelling reductions in the birth rate; 
the results are broadly analogous. 
  Variables with small coefficients and little or no explanatory power 
included PCURB, DAGQ, and PCMUSLIM.  The failure of PCMUSLIM does not come 
as a surprise, given its high correlation with population density.  The failure of 
DAGQ supports an entitlements approach to the crisis in the following sense: 
eastern divisions experienced lower proportionate declines in the aman crop in 
1942, but they were deficit provinces.  The huge gap, documented earlier, 
between black market prices in east and west Bengal after July 1943 implies 
that market forces failed to move rice from where it was in relative surplus to 
where it was in relative deficit at the height of the crisis.  Our price data fail to 
capture the market segmentation that became much more of a problem after 
mid-1943; perhaps this explains why data on rice prices by division up to mid-
1943 (PRATIO) fail to account for the variation in births or deaths. 
 
5. CONCLUSION: 
The Bengal famine is sometimes described as India’s last, although most 
of its victims lived in the mainly Muslim area that would become East Pakistan 
between 1947 and 1971 and thereafter Bangladesh.  The famine has become 
paradigmatic as an ‘entitlements famine’, whereby speculation born of greed  
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and panic produced an ‘artificial’ shortage of rice, the staple food.  Here I have 
argued that the lack of political will to divert foodstuffs from the war effort 
rather than speculation in the sense outlined was mainly responsible for the 
famine.  Those in authority at the time knew that there was a shortfall.  The war 
cabinet in London chose not to act on it.   Churchill’s lack of empathy for India 
and ‘all to do with it’ mattered; his immediate reaction to Amery’s last-ditch 
plea for more shipping on November 10
th was ‘a preliminary flourish on Indians 
breeding like rabbits and being paid a million a day by us for doing nothing about 
the war’.
110 
Neither price movements nor the outcome of the food drives of the 
summer of 1943 support the case for massive hoards of rice being kept from the 
market in the hopes of further price increases.  Markets did ‘fail’ in another 
sense, however: the disruption of transport facilities led to huge increases in the 
price of rice in the east of the province, which suffered most during the famine, 
during the second half of 1943.  The problem in Bengal in 1943 was not 
internecine strife, but the failure of the imperial power to make good a harvest 
shortfall that would have been manageable in peacetime.  The famine was the 





Table 1. Debt by Occupational Group, Bengal 1943-46 
Occupational 
Group 
Sample size  % Families in debt  Average loan per 
family [Rs.] 
  1943-4 1946  1943  1944  1946  1943 1944  1946 
Cultivator  7,005 22,204  34.6  61.7  63.2  90.0 88.4  159 
Agricultural 
Labour 
2,463 5,148  21.8  50.5  49.3  56.9 51.8  71 
Other 
Agricultural 
907 2,604  33.9  56.8  56.0  115.1 115.9  306 
All 
Agricultural 
10,375 29,956  31.4  58.6  60.0  87.6 83.3  158 
Non-
Agricultural 
4,394 16,658  25.6  52.6  42.1  79.5 79.2  120 
Total  14,769 46,614  29.8  56.9  53.7  85.5 82.2  148 







TABLE 2. CORRELATION MATRIX 






















DDRA   1.00                   
DDRB   .784   1.00               
DBR  -.417   .075   1.00               
MAGQ  -.070   .159  .413 1.00             
DAGQ   .168  -.104  -.429 -.700   1.00           
PCURB  .108 .055  .090 -.214  -.055  1.00         
PCMUS   .176   .081  -.328 -.214   .326  -.527  1.00       
YNGLIT  .077 -.271  -.094 -.404   .195  .261  .037  1.00     
CDR  -.513 -.628  -.250 .014   .030  -.026  -.144  -.251  1.00    
PRATIO  -.141 -.190  .129 .597  -.405  -.144  .031  .093  .041 1.00   









TABLE 3. SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 Mean  SD  Min  Max 
DDRA  93.90  47.70  13.83  178.02 
DDRB  121.17  66.12  20.40  271.83 
DBR  -39.23  15.98  -65.75  -0.52 
MAGQ  93.60  25.03  41.5  152.10 
DAGQ  -32.86  21.75  -65.23  19.55 
PCURB  5.73  5.87  1.08  24.41 
PCMUS  52.98  26.26  2.42  83.93 
YNGLIT  6.72  2.15  3.18  11.55 
CDR  20.93  4.07  12.80  29.50 








TABLE 4. MODELLING THE VARIATION IN EXCESS MORTALITY 
 
 DDRA  DDRB 
  I II  III  IV  V VI 
MAGQ  .737       .803    
DAGQ  .320      -.072    
DENSITY41      .128 **     .085 **       .083 *  .168 **   
PCURBAN  1.97       2.91    
PCMUSLIM  -.417       -.078    
YNGLIT    -4.73 *   -4.89 **  -3.47 **    -14.5 *  -16.4 **   -14.9 ** 
DBR      -1.81 **    2.16 **  -.694 
CDR  -2.43 -3.60  -8.24 **     -9.05 **       -12.9 ** 
PRATIO  -6.88       -20.5      
N  24 24  24  24  24 24 
Prob > F  .017 .002  .000  .005  .006 .000 
Adjusted R
2  .467 .447  .516  .504  .378 .556 






TABLE 5. MODELLING THE VARIATION IN LOST BIRTHS 
  VII VIII  IX 
MAGQ   .088     
DAGQ  -.028     
DENSITY41      -.049 **   -.044 **  -.034 ** 
PCURBAN  -.695     
PCMUSLIM   .070     
YOUNGLIT       1.98  **  .645   
DDR      -.116 ** 
CDR      -2.41 **   -2.47 **  -2.89 ** 
PRATIO  -4.22     
N 24  24  25 
Prob > F  .002  .000  .000 
Adjusted R
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Alipur 1901-70  6589 +1.15  S 24 Parganas 
Sagar Island  1901-70  9009  +1.51  S 24 Parganas 
Sandheads 1901-70  4133  +0.27  S 24 Parganas 
Budge Budge  1901-70  6479  +1.27  S 24 Parganas 
Borsat 1901-59  3721   -0.01  N 24 Parganas 
Basirhat 1901-70  6722  +1.87  N 24 Parganas 
Gosaba 1901-56  5921  +0.87  S 24 Parganas 
Krishnanagar 1901-70  5463  +1.36  Nadia 
Ranamagat 1901-67  3657  +0.38  Nadia 
Haringhata 1908-66  4308  +0.53  Nadia 
Berhampore 1901-70  7946  +2.70  Murshidabad 
Azimganj 1901-61  4171  +0.46  Murshidabad 
Potkabari 1901-56  3965  +0.89  Murshidabad 
Kalyanganj 1906-54  4509  +0.96  Murshidabad 
Bharatpur 1931-60  4724  +1.65  Mursihdabad 
Gangarampur 1901-68  5929  +0.87  Dakshin Dinajpur 
Itahar 1901-62  7152 +1.58  Uttar Dinajpur 
Raiganj 1901-59  3810  +0.01  Uttar Dinajpur 
Balmghat 1901-70  7948  +1.22  Dakshin Dinajpur 
Jalpaiguri 1901-70  4262   -1.05  Jalpaiguri 
Buxa 1901-68  8331   -0.59  Jalpaiguri 
Kalchini 1901-66  7107   -0.14  Jalpaiguri 
Darjeeling 1901-70  5026   -0.27  Darjeeling 
Kalmipong 1921-70  3589   -0.44  Darjeeling 
Siliguri 1901-67  6355   -0.62  Darjeeling 
Mongpoo 1901-70  4060   -0.60  Darjeeling 
Kurseong 190-170  7280   -0.24  Darjeeling 
Bagdogra 1901-47  5654  +0.53  Darjeeling 
Malda 1901-70  5195 +0.67  Malda 
Gazole 1901-57  5486  +0.80  Malda 
KB Aerow 1901-70  5441   -0.60  Koch Bihar 
Dinhata 1901-58  5059   -0.40  Koch Bihar 
Mathabhanga 1901-67  5113   -0.52  Koch Bihar 
Mekliganj 1901-55  4760   -0.67  Koch Bihar 
Tufamganj 190-165  6005   -0.46  Koch Bihar 
Asansol 1919-70  3505  +0.13  Bardhaman 
Burdwan 1901-70  5165  +1.07  Bardhaman 
Kalna 1901-63  3937 +0.78  Bardhaman 
Katwa 1901-66  4716 +1.05  Bardhaman 
Suri 1901-70  4519  +0.80  Birbhum 
Bolpur 1901-66  4267  +1.03  Birbhum 
Mayureshwar 1934-61  3653  +0.99  Midnapore 
Bankura 1901-70  4144  +0.62  Bankura 
Khatra 1901-63  4712  +1.53  Bankura 
Indus 1901-66  5032  +1.61  Bankura 
Kotalpur 1901-58  4239  +0.63  Bankura 
Onda 1901-57  4598  +1.83  Bankura 
Gangajalghati 1901-61  3497  +0.51  Bankura  
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Sanamukhi 1901-63  5921  +2.63  Bankura 
Taldangra 1915-70  5631  +1.11  Bankura 
Indpur 1915-67  3617  +0.54  Bankura 
Barjora 1918-63  4130  +1.51  Bankura 
Simlapal 1918-69  5037  +1.31  Bankura 
Majhia 1918-55  4226  +1.31  Bankura 
Palasdanga 1919-62  4617  +0.96  Bankura 
Chatna 1916-67  4297  +0.98  Bankura 
Ranibandh 1919-70  4607  +1.33  Bankura 
Saltora 1919-68  2728  -0.01  Bankura 
Ambikanagar 1919-44  3800  +0.98  Bankura 
Patnasayar 1938-61  5354  +1.18  Bankura 
Deuli 1941-63  3718  -0.15  W Midnapur 
Saranga 1915-56  5018  +1.87  W Midnapur 
Midnapore 190-170  7498  +2.30  W Midnapur 
Contai 1901-50  9850  +2.30  E Midnapur 
Tamluk 1901-70  7539  +1.36  E Midnapur 
Panskura 1901-70  4887  +0.69  E Midnapur 
Gopiballabhpur 1914-54  8041  +2.29  E Midnapur 
S Belpahari  1909-69  4187  +0.64  E Midnapur 
Narayangarh 1911-63  3742  +0.01  E Midnapur 
Ramnagar 1910-67  8013  +1.42  E Midnapur 
Kolaghat 1922-70  3253   -0.13  E Midnapur 
Balichak 1922-69  7135  +1.87  E Midnapur 
Kharagpore 1923-70  6697  +1.52  W Midnapur 
Amlagora 1901-56  5589  +1.58  W Midnapur 
Serampore 1901-63  4107  +0.16  Hooghly 
Hooghly 1901-62  4783  +0.76  Hooghly 
Arambagh 1901-68  5456  +1.65  Hooghly 
Chandktala 1928-61  5344  +0.08  Hooghly 
Tentulia 1931-56  5939  +1.99  Hooghly 
Knanakul 1929-65  5633  +1.03  Hooghly 
Tarakeshwar 1932-64  5957  +1.46  Hooghly 
Howrah 1901-48  6142  +1.60  Howrah 
Uluberia 1901-68  7139  +2.35  Howrah 
Purulia 1901-70  3107   -0.16  Purulia 
Raqhunathpur 1901-70 4099  +0.86  Purulia 
Barabazar 1901-68  5329  +1.55  Purulia 
Jhaldah 1901-61  3691  +0.27  Purulia 
Manbazar 1901-62  4744  +1.26  Purulia 
Bagmandi 1936-62  3607   -0.07  Purulia 
Jaipur 1936-55  2019   -1.33  Purulia 
Para 1936-68  2678   -0.60  Purulia 
Source: http://dss.ucar.edu/datasets/ds575.0/data/part5of5 
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